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jured by the policyholder). In this case,
Montrose allegedly disposed of hazardous
waste before the period of Admiral's in-
surance coverage began. The Supreme
Court held that standard CGL coverage
includes bodily injury and property dam-
age that occurs during the policy period-
even if initially caused by preceding events.
In the case of successive policies (some-
times by different insurers), a deteriorat-
ing type of injury and property damage is
covered by "all policies in effect during
those periods."
The Montrose case involved the pro-
duction of DDT from 1947 until 1972;
after the pesticide's domestic ban, Mon-
trose continued production until 1982 for
export. Seven different carriers covered
Montrose from 1960 to 1986, with Admi-
ral involved only during the 1982-1986
period. Admiral argued that it had no duty
to defend and no coverage obligation since
there was no dumping during the policy
period and no "occurrence" under the pol-
icy triggered its coverage; rather, the prob-
lem was an uninsurable "loss in progress"
at the time it wrote its first policy in 1982.
The court agreed that such a limitation
may be appropriate in the first-party con-
text where one is insuring against liability
from an act or event, but that coverage for
injuries to third parties by the insured is
based on injury, not event. The impact of
this decision may be momentous in terms
of the insurability of any enterprise with a
latent liability for a preexisting hazard.
In Quintano v. Mercury Casualty
Company, 11 Cal. 4th 1049 (Dec. 6,
1995), the California Supreme Court ruled
that the statute of limitations governing
uninsured motorist claims does not apply
to claims based on underinsurance cover-
age, if the claim against the underinsured
motorist is settled. The court reasoned that
the basic differences in the settlement pro-
cess for uninsured motorist coverage and
underinsured motorist coverage make it
clear that he legislature did not intend the
statute of limitations for the former to
apply also to the latter. Chief Justice Mal-
colm Lucas held that in an uninsured mo-
torist situation, the insured is not required
to pursue legal action against the unin-
sured motorist before making a claim
under the policy, whereas under Insurance
Code section 11580.2, underinsured cov-
erage is only available after the insured
has obtained payment in the amount of the
tortfeasor's policy limits.
Manufacturers Life Insurance Com-
pany v. Superior Court (Weil Insurance
Agency, Inc., Real Party in Interest), 10
Cal. 4th 257 (June 1, 1995), involves the
important interplay between state antitrust
statutes (Business and Professions Code
section 16700 et seq.), the Unfair Compe-
tition Act (Business and Professions Code
section 17200 et seq.), and the unfair busi-
ness practice provisions of the Insurance
Code itself (Insurance Code section 790 et
seq.). [15:1 CRLR 116-17; 14:4 CRLR
131; 14:2&3 CRLR 139] Manufacturers
Life contended that antitrust law does not
apply to insurance, and that the exclusive
remedy for unfair business practices vests
with the Insurance Commissioner under
section 790 et seq. of the Insurance Code.
Affirming the First District Court of
Appeal's decision, the court held that life
insurance has not been granted a general
exemption from antitrust law coverage,
and that state antitrust law and the Unfair
Competition Act generally provide reme-
dies which are coextensive and cumula-
tive to those available to the Commis-
sioner under the Insurance Code (e.g., li-
cense revocation). However, the court
held that where a violation is alleged of the
Insurance Code provisions alone, it is not
for that reason an "unfair or unlawful" act
in competition giving rise to the additional
remedies of the Unfair Competition Act.
This limitation is not likely to be a prob-
lem for plaintiffs, given the possibility of
alleging unfair or unlawful acts separate







PDursuant to Vehicle Code section 3000
et seq., the New Motor Vehicle Board
(NMVB) licenses new motor vehicle deal-
erships and regulates dealership reloca-
tions and manufacturer terminations of
franchises. It reviews disciplinary action
taken against dealers by the Department of
Motor Vehicles (DMV). Most licensees
deal in cars or motorcycles.
NMVB is authorized to adopt regula-
tions to implement its enabling legisla-
tion; the Board's regulations are codified
in Chapter 2, Division 1, Title 13 of the
California Code of Regulations (CCR).
The Board also handles disputes arising
out of warranty reimbursement schedules.
After servicing or replacing parts in a car
under warranty, a dealer is reimbursed by
the manufacturer. The manufacturer sets
reimbursement rates which a dealer occa-
sionally challenges as unreasonable. In-
frequently, the manufacturer's failure to
compensate the dealer for tests performed
on vehicles is questioned.
On August 10, Governor Pete Wilson
announced the reappointment of Marie
Brooks and Michel Padilla to the Board.
Brooks is the president and founder of Ellis
Brooks Chevrolet-Pontiac-Nissan-Geo in
San Francisco; she has served on NMVB
since 1992. Padilla is the president of Gate-
way Chevrolet in Anaheim; he has served
on NMVB since 1992.
* MAJOR PROJECTS
Protest/Petition Actions. The matter of
Gunderson-lhle Chevrolet, Inc., v. Chevrolet
Motor Division, General Motors Corpora-
tion (Protest No. PR-1380-93) was first
brought before NMVB in June 1994.
Gunderson-Ihle and three other Chevrolet
dealers (whose protests were later with-
drawn) instituted this action to preclude
Chevrolet from carrying out its intention to
relocate Clippinger Chevrolet from its loca-
tion in Covina to a West Covina site off the
Interstate 10 Freeway in Gunderson-lhle's
market area. Gunderson-Ihle claimed that
the relocation would adversely affect its per-
manent investments; there would be an ad-
verse effect on the retail motor vehicle busi-
ness and the consuming public in the rele-
vant market area; the establishment of an
additional franchise would be injurious to
the public welfare; the existing Chevrolet
dealers in the relevant market area re pro-
viding adequate competition and convenient
consumer care for Chevrolet motor vehicles
including adequate motor vehicle sales and
service facilities, equipment, supply of vehi-
cle parts, and qualified service personnel;
and the establishment of an additional deal-
ership would not increase competition and
would not be in the public interest. Finally,
Gunderson-Ihle claimed that Chevrolet
made oral and/or written promises to
Gunderson-Ihle, as part of Chevrolet's
"Project 2000," that it would have an exclu-
sive freeway dealership location on the I- 10
freeway from Ontario to the Pacific Ocean,
inducing Gunderson-Ihle to relocate to its
current location, a move it would not have
made had it known Chevrolet would ulti-
mately attempt to relocate Clippinger to
the proposed site.
After reviewing the evidence submit-
ted by the parties, the administrative law
judge (AU) decided that Gunderson-Ihle
failed to show good cause for not allowing
the relocation of Clippinger; this proposed
decision was adopted by NMVB on Au-
gust 25, 1994. [14:4 CRLR 194] Having
exhausted its remedy with NMVB, Gunder-
son-Ihlie asserted its claim within Los An-
geles County Superior Court, which even-
tually ordered discovery of any and all
documents pertaining to Chevrolet's "Proj-
ect 2000" and remanded the matter to
NMVB.
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Having decided against Gunderson-
Ihle on the merits of its other claims, the
sole issue presented at the August 1995
hearing was whether the previously undis-
closed documents of Chevrolet's "Project
2000" supported the claim that Chevrolet
had promised Gunderson-Ihle an exclu-
sive market area on the 1-10 freeway from
Ontario to the Pacific Ocean.
After reviewing the documents, the AL
found that "Project 2000," as it pertains to
this matter, is a plan developed by Chevrolet
to locate its dealers in strategic marketing
areas in order to position Chevrolet and its
dealers for vehicle sales and customer ser-
vice into the next century. Chevrolet account
managers discussed particular dealer plans
with each dealer; it was at such a meeting
that Gunderson-Ihle contends that it was
assured that no other dealers would be lo-
cated in the marketing area at issue. How-
ever, the ALJ considered it significant that
the account managers were instructed by
Chevrolet to maintain the confidentiality of
each individual dealer plan and were in-
structed not to discuss any dealer's plans
with any other dealer except the affected
dealers themselves. The ALJ also found that
Gunderson-Ihle was never shown any doc-
uments pertaining to "Project 2000" and
therefore could not have relied upon them.
Accordingly, the ALJ found that the pre-
viously undisclosed documents contra-
dicted Gunderson-Ihle's contentions and
supported Chevrolet's intent to permit
Clippinger to relocate, and thus recom-
mended that the Board overrule the protest;
on September 12, NMVB adopted the AL's
findings and recommendations.
The matter of Person Oldsmobile v.
Oldsmobile Motor Division, General Mo-
tors Corporation (Petition No. P-208-90)
was brought before the Board by Person
Oldsmobile after Person received notice
from Oldsmobile in March 1990 that it
intended to establish Oldsmobile repre-
sentation on a dual basis with a then-exist-
ing Chevrolet dealer in Person's market-
ing area. Person immediately filed a pro-
test with the Board, disputing the ability
of Oldsmobile to carry out its intention
(Protest No. PR-1158-90). Pursuant to the
recommendations of the AL, the Board
overruled the protest in September 1990;
Oldsmobile was thus permitted to estab-
lish the proposed dealership.
In addition to the protest, Person filed
the instant petition against Oldsmobile,
alleging fraud in the inducement to enter
into the franchise that existed between
Person and Oldsmobile. On April 19,
1995, the Board issued an order splitting
the issues of liability and damages raised
by the petition; the hearing on the liability
portion was held before an ALJ in May.
Person contended that at the time it
signed its dealer sales and service agree-
ment with Oldsmobile, Oldsmobile had
plans to establish an opening for a new
Oldsmobile dealership within the market
area Person believed it was acquiring, and
that Oldsmobile concealed or otherwise
failed to disclose this information. Person
further contended that this failure to disclose
amounted to fraud because a franchisor
has a duty to disclose such facts that would
materially affect the desirability of the fran-
chise. Person asserted that NMVB should
require disclosure of any final, formal rec-
ommendation by a factory zone to its na-
tional dealer planning manager for the es-
tablishment of an open point, as such in-
formation would substantially impact the
desirability of a franchise to an applicant.
The main issue presented at the hearing
was whether there is any fiduciary or spe-
cial relationship between a prospective
new motor vehicle dealer franchisee and
the prospective franchisor which would
require disclosure of all facts known to the
franchisor which could reasonably affect
the prospective franchisee's decision to
execute the sales and service agreement.
Citing state and federal law, the ALJ ex-
plained that there is no fiduciary relation-
ship between an automobile manufacturer
and its dealers, and that the franchise rela-
tionship amounts to nothing more than an
ordinary commercial transaction. Deter-
mining that no fiduciary or special rela-
tionship exists between a prospective new
motor vehicle franchisee and franchisor,
the ALJ concluded that there is no duty to
disclose all facts known by the franchisor
which would reasonably affect the pro-
spective dealer's decision to execute the
sales and service agreement. Accordingly,
the ALl recommended to the Board that
the petition be overruled; on September
12, NMVB adopted the findings of the
ALJ.
Mark K. Edward, Michael L. Edward
and William R. Winterhalder v. Mazda
Motor of America, Inc. (Petition No. P-
290-94) involved individuals acting col-
lectively as prospective buyers to pur-
chase Santa Cruz Motors. In February
1992, petitioners and Santa Cruz Motors
entered into a written agreement whereby
Santa Cruz Motors agreed to sell all inter-
est in the dealership to petitioners. The
franchise agreement between Santa Cruz
Motors and Mazda required the consent of
Mazda to the assignment of the Mazda
franchise agreement to third parties, such
consent not to be unreasonably withheld.
By a letter dated May 22, 1992, Mazda
agreed to the assignment of the franchise
to the petitioners, conditioned upon the
commitment that the petitioners would ei-
ther by construction of a new site or reno-
vation of the existing site bring the facii-
ties into compliance with Mazda's mini-
mum guidelines concerning, among other
things, square footage for the new car
showroom, the parts building, the new and
used car display, and storage. In the instant
petition, petitioners asserted that this con-
dition amounted to an unreasonable with-
holding of consent.
In recommending that the petition be
overruled, the ALJ found it significant that
the existing facilities fell far below the
minimum standards set out by Mazda. The
ALJ also found that although no action
was taken to comply with the standards
except for a failed attempt at development
of a new auto mall, alternatives did exist
that would have satisfied the standards.
Accordingly, the ALJ found that Mazda
did not unreasonably withhold consent o
the assignment via its condition. On Sep-
tember 12, NMVB adopted the AL's
findings and recommendation and over-
ruled the petition.
Appeals. On October 18, in Forty-
Niner Sierra Resources, dba Forty-Niner
Subaru/Isuzu v. State of California, De-
partment of Motor Vehicles (Appeal No.
A-131-95), NMVB upheld DMV's deci-
sion revoking Forty-Niner's dealer's li-
cense for selling vehicles with mileage
exceeding 7,500 miles while representing
the vehicles as new. The revocation was
stayed with the following conditions: the
dealer's license was suspended for thirty
consecutive days; Forty-Niner must reim-
burse DMV for $75,000 in costs sustained
in the action; and Forty-Niner's dealer's
license was placed on probation for four
years.
The matter of World Nissan, Inc. v.
State of California, Department of Motor
Vehicles (Appeal No. A-132-95) arises
from an accusation filed by DMV in Sep-
tember 1993 asserting that World Nissan
engaged in acts of moral turpitude, includ-
ing false advertising and advertising a spe-
cific vehicle for sale without a vehicle
identification number or license number
(for which it was criminally convicted fol-
lowing a plea of nolo contendere), illegal
use of dealer plates; failure to sell a vehicle
at the advertised price; submission of dis-
honored checks to DMV; failure to pay the
administrative service fee in a timely man-
ner; and failure to register vehicles in a
timely manner.
In September 1994, an ALJ recom-
mended that the findings justified a revo-
cation of World Nissan's dealer's license.
The recommendation further proposed
that World Nissan could reactivate its li-
cense subject to several conditions and a
three-year probation period; however,
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DMV did not adopt the ALJ's proposed
decision in its entirety. In March 1995, the
DMV Director issued his decision order-
ing the dealer's license revoked without
the possibility of reactivation and issuance
of a probationary license; DMV's decision
relied upon the ALJ's finding that the ad-
vertising violations constituted moral tur-
pitude.
World Nissan filed the instant appeal
with NMVB in April 1995; after hearing
all arguments and considering the evi-
dence, NMVB held that a violation of the
Automobile Franchise Act (Vehicle Code
section 3000 et seq.) is not per se moral
turpitude, and that if moral turpitude exists
in a given case, it must be based on the
particular circumstances surrounding the
conviction(s) and whether the convic-
tion(s) demonstrates unfitness to practice
as a licensed new motor vehicle dealer,
manufacturer, manufacturer branch, dis-
tributor, distributor branch, or representa-
tive. Board members reasoned that state
courts have been reluctant to hold that any
but the most abhorrent crimes constitute
moral turpitude per se in cases where an
individual's vested right to pursue a par-
ticular profession or vocation is at stake.
Accordingly, the Board ordered that
World Nissan's dealer's license be sus-
pended for thirty days, and stayed the
order until World Nissan applies for issu-
ance of a new occupational license as a
new motor vehicle dealer. In addition,
NMVB ordered that any subsequent occu-
pational license as a new motor vehicle
dealer issued to World Nissan will be pro-
bationary for a period of three years from
the issuance of the license, and any license
issued to World Nissan during the three-
year probationary period will be issued
only as a probationary license.
* LEGISLATION
AB 28 (Gallegos). Existing law makes
it unlawful for the holder of any dealer's
license to fail to disclose in writing to the
buyer of a new motor vehicle that the
vehicle, as equipped, may not be operated
on a highway signed for the requirement
of tire chains if the owner's manual or
other material provided by the manufac-
turer states that the vehicle, as equipped,
may not be operated with tire chains. As
amended July 18, this bill requires vehicle
manufacturers to provide franchised deal-
ers with a list of the affected vehicles, and
requires the dealer to provide a specified
disclosure statement o the buyer or lessee
of a new motor vehicle, in not less than
fourteen-point boldface type on a single
piece of paper. The bill requires the dealer
to furnish the buyer or lessee with a copy
of the disclosure, signed by the buyer or
lessee, prior to the sale or lease of the
vehicle. This bill was signed by the Gov-
ernor on September 2 (Chapter 452, Stat-
utes of 1995).
AB 770 (Aguiar). Existing law pro-
hibits the holder of any motor vehicle
dealer's license from advertising for sale
or selling any new vehicle of a line-make
for which the dealer does not hold a fran-
chise; a violation of that provision is a
misdemeanor. Existing law makes several
exceptions to that general prohibition, in-
cluding transactions involving a commer-
cial vehicle. As amended May l1, this bill
limits the exception for transactions in-
volving a commercial vehicle to commer-
cial vehicles with a gross vehicle weight
rating of more than 10,000 pounds. The
bill adds to the list of exceptions specified
above a transaction involving a manufac-
tured home, a vehicle purchased forexport
and exported outside the territorial limits
of the United States without being regis-
tered with DMV, or a new vehicle that will
be substantially altered or modified by a
converter, which the bill defines, prior to
resale.
Existing law requires DMV to furnish
an autobroker's registration certificate to
a dealer who registers with DMV as an
autobroker. This bill instead requires DMV
to furnish the dealer with an autobroker's
endorsement o the dealer's license. This
bill was signed by the Governor on July
30 (Chapter 211, Statutes of 1995).
AB 1381 (Speier). The Automotive
Consumer Notification Act requires the
seller of a vehicle to include a specified
"lemon law" disclosure if that vehicle
has been returned, or should have been
returned, to the dealer or manufacturer
for failure to conform to warranties. As
amended August 21, this bill revises and
recast the Automotive Consumer Notifi-
cation Act to, among other things, require
the manufacturer to retitle specified defec-
tive vehicles in its name, request DMV to
inscribe the ownership certificate with a
"lemon buy-back" notation, affix a "lemon
*buy-back" decal to the left doorframe of
the vehicle, deliver a specified notice to
the transferee of the vehicle, and obtain
the transferee's acknowledgment. The bill
provides that it shall apply only to vehicles
reacquired by a manufacturer on or after
January 1, 1996. This bill was signed by
the Governor on October 3 (Chapter 503,
Statutes of 1995).
AB 1383 (Speier), as amended July
28, would make existing law which autho-
rizes the Department of Consumer Affairs
(DCA) to certify third-party dispute reso-
lution processes for "lemon law" disputes
inoperative for a four-year period, during
which time alternative provisions added
by the bill would be operative. Among
other things, the bill would require DCA
to impose an additional fee of up to $2 on
the sale of all new motor vehicles to be
used solely for the purposes of the bill
subject to appropriation by the legislature.
Existing law specifies the remedies for
breach of a consumer warranty, including
the remedies for breach of an express war-
ranty. This bill would eliminate the above
provisions which specify the damages
available for breach of an express con-
sumer warranty, and replace them with
provisions applicable solely to motor ve-
hicle manufacturers who refuse to partic-
ipate in or comply with a decision ren-
dered pursuant to state-certified new car
arbitration proceedings under the bill. [S.
Jud]
AB 1218 (Escutia), as amended July
29, is no longer applicable to NMVB.
SB 1085 (Wright), as amended April
5, is a spot bill making minor changes in
the law requiring DCA to certify qualified
third-party dispute resolution processes to









n 1922, California voters approved a
constitutional initiative which created
the Board of Osteopathic Examiners; 1991
legislation changed the Board's name to
the Osteopathic Medical Board of Califor-
nia (OMBC). Today, pursuant to Business
and Professions Code section 3600 et seq.,
OMBC regulates entry into the osteopathic
profession, examines and approves schools
and colleges of osteopathic medicine, and
enforces professional standards. The Board
is empowered to adopt regulations to im-
plement its enabling legislation; OMBC's
regulations are codified in Division 16,
Title 16 of the California Code of Regula-
tions (CCR). The 1922 initiative, which
provided for a five-member Board con-
sisting of practicing doctors of osteopathy
(DOs), was amended in 1982 to include
two public members. The Board now con-
sists of seven members, appointed by the
Governor, serving staggered three-year
terms.
On June 27, Governor Wilson ap-
pointed attorney Navid Sharafatian to a
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